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Abstract
Currently, a lack of interpretation tools and methodologies hinders the ability to assess the performance of a single piece
of equipment or a total system. Therefore, a reliability, availability, and maintainability analysis must be combined with a
quantitative reliability impact analysis to interpret the actual performance and identify bottlenecks and improvement
opportunities. This article proposes a novel methodology that uses reliability, availability, and maintainability analysis to
quantify the expected impact. The strengths of the failure expected impact methodology include its ability to systemati-
cally and quantitatively assess the expected impact in terms of reliability, availability, and maintainability indicators and the
logical configuration of subsystems and individual equipment, which show the direct effects of each element on the total
system. This proposed analysis complements plant modeling and analysis. Determining the operational effectiveness
impact, as the final result of the computation process, enables the quantitative and unequivocal prioritization of the sys-
tem elements by assessing the associated loss as a ‘‘production loss’’ regarding its unavailability and effect on the system
process. The Chilean copper smelting process study provides useful results for developing a hierarchization that enables
an analysis of improvement actions that are aligned with the best opportunities.
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Introduction and background
Literature review
The effectiveness of production processes and their
associated equipment is an important tool for assessing
total system effectiveness,1 which is generally measured
according to the results of reliability and availability
indicators and life cycle economic analysis.2 The total
equipment effectiveness indicator measures the produc-
tive efficiency using the control parameters as a basis
for calculating the fundamentals of industrial produc-
tion: availability, efficiency, and quality.3
In the current literature, several investigations have
been performed to identify the principal factors that
directly affect the maximization of economic benefits;
these factors converge at the empirical consideration of
reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM)
indicators. The traditional reliability analyses that are
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based on logical and probabilistic modeling contribute
to the improved key performance indicators (KPIs) of
a system,4 which directly influence optimal operation
designs.5 However, many alternatives are available for
system reliability analyses that employ analytical tech-
niques, such as Markov models,6 Poisson models,7 uni-
versal generating function (UGF) and decision
diagram.8 This systematic study is based on techniques
such as reliability block diagrams (RBDs),9,10 fault
trees (FTs),11 reliability graphics (RGs),12 and Petri
nets (PNs);13 these techniques can be used to determine
logical relationships that underlie the behavior or
dynamics of a process.
As an example, the productive processes in the min-
ing industry have numerous equipment and systems,
rendering a systematic analysis of the plant more diffi-
cult.4 Different analysis methodologies, such as the
RBD methodology,9,10 have been developed and exten-
sively applied in the mining sector due to their adapt-
ability in representing complex arrangements and
environments with large amounts of equipment, simpli-
fying reliability analysis. For the correct development
of an RAM analysis, a complete scan of the data must
be performed to fit the data to a statistical model and
to then obtain key indicators.14 Using a maintenance
management support tool, different improvement
opportunities can be identified, and recommendations
can be offered to develop the most appropriate
actions.15
The Birnbaum importance measure (IM)16 ranks the
components of the system with respect to the impact of
their failure on the overall system’s performance; how-
ever, its application is primarily related to epistemic
uncertainties.
Interpretation tools and methodologies for under-
standing the performance of a single piece of equipment
and a total system are lacking; this deficiency is even
more pronounced when the selected analysis process
has been disaggregated on many levels, and each level
has been disaggregated across several pieces of equip-
ment. Therefore, an RAM analysis must be combined
with a quantitative reliability impact analysis to deter-
mine the real performance and identify bottlenecks and
opportunities for improvement.
Motivation of work
This article proposes an integral and quantitative inno-
vative methodology to analyze the RAM and plant fail-
ure expected impact (FEI). The FEI analysis is related
specifically to production capacity and the effect of pre-
ventive and corrective maintenance intervention on sys-
tem availability. This proposal designs a novel
algorithm to compute an impact index based on the fre-
quency of failures associated, with the reliability and
maintainability of the machinery and the expected
impact according to different scenarios and configura-
tions. This impact index, based on a probabilistic
approach, defines the expected condition of the item in
the system from a perspective of evaluation of its possi-
ble states (intrinsic behavior) and related to the logical
and functional configuration of the system. This
approach enables an overall comparison of elements
and the prioritization of those elements, as well as a
partial effectiveness assessment.
What is the motivation for applying the FEI methodology? In
the finance area, for example, when a single stock of the
NASDAQ index has a variation price of 10% and this
stock represents 5% of the index composition, the
NASDAQ index increases by only 0.5%. Developing a
similar analysis over an ‘‘element’’ failure and determin-
ing the system consequences are simple when the ‘‘ele-
ments’’ have a serial configuration. If the configuration
employs redundancy logic, the result is uncertain and
dependent on the reliability and maintainability of the
elements that compose the subsystem. The FEI metho-
dology solves this problem by proposing four steps and
applying them to a mining process—specifically, a cop-
per smelting process (CSP) in Chile. Related to failure
impact methodology, a novel algorithm is proposed to
compute a failure impact index for the total availability
performance of the system based on the reliability (fre-
quency of failures), maintainability (downtime), and
availability of the elements. This impact index defines
the expected condition of the item in the system by eval-
uating its possible states (intrinsic behavior) and the
logical and functional configuration of the system. This
analysis enables a total comparison of the elements,
their prioritization, and a failure impact evaluation.
Scope of work
The two key indicators of FEI methodology are out-
lined in Figure 1, which incorporates general formulas
for analysis and calculation. This methodology seeks to
explain the level of responsibility for a failure in a sin-
gle piece of equipment (b3) for system inoperability
from a historical perspective. Two important steps are
included:
1. Explain the effect of a single failure (downtime
Ti of equipment b3) in terms of the single down-
time propagation in the system (equivalent
downtime ti). This indicator is named the
expected downtime factor propagation (E-
DFP).
2. Explain the effect of a single downtime propa-
gation (equipment b3) on the total downtime of
the system (downtime responsibility). This
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indicator is named the expected operational cri-
ticality index (E-OCI).
A copper smelting plant in Chile is examined as a
case study. The smelting process is one of the most
important and critical phases in any mineral processing
system, especially in copper plants.1 The selected min-
ing process is divided into four main subsystems: dry-
ing, concentrate fusion, conversion, and refining.
This article is structured as follows: section ‘‘FEI
methodology’’ describes the reliability assessment based
on the FEI methodology and presents its conceptual
and mathematical basis, section ‘‘Case study’’ intro-
duces and develops the case study according to the
methodology, and section ‘‘Conclusion’’ explains the
main results and conclusions.
FEI methodology
The FEI methodology should consider the joint pro-
cesses that are necessary for identifying improvement
opportunities and generating maintenance recommen-
dations. These processes can be summarized in four
steps: data cleaning, data management, RAM analysis,
and FEI quantification (E-OCI and E-DFP) and deci-
sion making.
Data cleaning
The first step is to purge and filter the obtained data to
improve the data quality (missing values, usefulness
records, and erroneous data).17
Data management
To achieve an efficient data management, some meth-
odologies can be considered based on the equipment
(historical reparable behavior). A repairable system
after a failure scenario can be restored to its function-
ing condition (perfect and imperfect) by maintenance
actions, with the exception of the replacement18 (nonre-
parable item). A reparable system is defined as follows:
‘‘A system that, after failing to perform one or more of
its functions satisfactorily, it can be restored to fully
satisfactory performance by any method other than
replacement of the entire system.’’19 The model and
analysis of reparable equipment have high importance,
mainly in order to increase the performance oriented to
reliability and maintenance as part of the cost reduc-
tion in this last item. Depending on the type of mainte-
nance given to equipment, it is possible to find five
cases:20
 Perfect maintenance or reparation. Maintenance
operation that restores the equipment to the con-
dition ‘‘as good as new.’’
 Minimum maintenance or reparation. Maintenance
operation that restores the equipment to the condi-
tion ‘‘as bad as old.’’
 Imperfect maintenance or reparation. Maintenance
operation that restores the equipment to the con-
dition ‘‘worse than new but better than old.’’
 Over-perfect maintenance or reparation.
Maintenance operation that restores the equip-
ment to the condition ‘‘better than new.’’
 Destructive maintenance or reparation. Maintenance
operation that restores the equipment to the condi-
tion ‘‘worse than old.’’
For a perfect maintenance, the most common devel-
oped model corresponds to the perfect renewal process
(PRP). In this, we assume that repairing action restores
the equipment to a condition as good as new and
assumes that times between failures in the equipment
are distributed by an identical and independent way.
The most used and common model PRP is the homoge-
neous Poisson process (HPP), which considers that the
system neither ages nor spoils independently of the pre-
vious pattern of failures. That is to say, it is a process
without memory. Regarding case b, ‘‘as bad as old’’ is
the opposite case to what happens in case a, ‘‘as good
as new,’’ since it is assumed that the equipment will stay
after the maintenance intervention in the same state
than before each failure. This consideration is based on
that the equipment is complex, composed by hundreds
of components, with many failure modes and the fact
that replacing or repairing a determined component will
not affect significantly the global state and age of the
equipment. In other words, the system is subject to min-
imum repairs, which does not cause any change or con-
siderable improvement. The most common model to
represent this case is through nonhomogeneous Poisson
process (NHPP), in this case the most used model to
Figure 1. Expected impact scheme.
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represent NHPP is called ‘‘Power Law.’’ In this model,
a Weibull distribution is assumed for the first failure
and that later, it is modified over time. Although the
models HPP and NHPP are the most used, they have a
practical restriction regarding its application since a
more realistic condition after a repairing action is what
we find between both: ‘‘worse than new but better than
old.’’ In order to find a generalization to this situation
and not distinguishing between HPP and NHPP, it was
necessary to create the generalized renewal process
(GRP).21 The main objective of this stage is to generate
parameters evaluation and basic indicators.
RAM analysis
Reliability analysis. Different alternatives have been pro-
posed for the individual and systemic logical–
functional representations of processes.4 Modeling a
complex system using RBDs is a well-known method
that has been adopted for different applications in sys-
tem reliability analysis.5,22 An RBD is constructed
after performing a logical decomposition of a system
into subsystems; the RBD is constructed to express
reliability logics such as series, redundancy, and
standby in a network of subsystems. RBDs are consid-
ered to be a modeling tool that is consolidated and
available for the normal duties of reliability analysis.
The RBD analysis methodology9,10 is used extensively
in the mining sector due to its adaptability for repre-
senting complex provisions and environments with
large amounts of equipment. An RBD can be applied
in addition to other reliability techniques, such as a
fault tree analysis (FTA).
Maintainability analysis. Maintainability performance is
defined as
the ability of an item under given conditions of use to be
retained in, or restored to, a state in which it can perform a
required function, when maintenance is performed under
given conditions and using stated procedures and resources.23
The ‘‘given conditions’’ refer to the conditions in which
the item is used and maintained, for example, climate
conditions, support conditions, human factors, and
geographical location. The maintainability of equip-
ment can be represented and understood as a probabil-
ity distribution of the maintenance completion time.
Parametric methods have been used to analyze histori-
cal time to repair (TTR) datasets in many case
studies.24
Availability analysis. According to Dhillon,5 availability is
the probability that the equipment is available as
required. Assuming that the required equipment must
always be operating and that maintenance orders are
immediately executed after a failure, the expected avail-
ability of the determined equipment can be defined25






Availability is probably the most important para-
meter because it is directly related to the equipment
performance, especially in a production environment
that is based on volume, such as the mining industry.
In this environment, the rate of production, among
other variables, determines the level of benefit that is
derived from the exercises. Monte Carlo simulation is
used as a modeling framework to represent the realistic
features of the equipment and the complex behavior of
high-dimensional systems to obtain the performance
indicators for the availability.4
FEI quantification and decision making
To implement an efficient asset management, an item
classification should be developed based on criteria
such as direct and indirect costs, failure rate, and
operational impact. The objective is to identify the rele-
vant elements in making priority maintenance decisions
and efficiently allocating resources. Many techniques
exist for asset hierarchy, and each technique has advan-
tages and disadvantages that depend on the operation
context.4 For this proposal, the authors present a novel
quantitative methodology for measurement based on
reliability impact using previous results of RAM
analysis.
FEI methodology. In this phase, the first indicator is the
E-OCI of each element in the system, which is deter-
mined by decomposing the global index and each sub-
system index26 on the following levels
E-OCIsystem i= 0 = 1 ð2Þ
Equation (2) represents the start of the process con-
sidering the E-OCI as a 100%. Then, the breakdown of
each level begins with the following equations
Xn
j= 1
E-OCIi;j =E-OCIi1 8i : 1, . . . , r; 8j : 1, . . . , n
ð3Þ
In equation (3), the E-OCI of a level is distributed in
all the elements that composed it, all this to keep the
consistence of the impact quantification. To determine
the E-OCI of each element of the lower level, it is
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necessary to develop equation (4), which considers the
distribution by an unavailability factor. In this sense,
the most unavailable element of the lower level obtains







  8i : 1, . . . , r; 8j : 1, . . . , n
ð4Þ
where E-OCIi;j is the E-OCI for element j (from 1 to n)
that is included in decomposition level i (from 1 to r)
and Ai;j is the expected availability for element j
(from 1 to n) that is included in decomposition level i
(from 1 to r).
In simple terms, the E-OCI shows the final contribu-
tion of each element toward mitigating the system’s lack
of effectiveness based on the production capacity loss.
When considering a lower detail level, such as level r,





E-OCIi;j = 1 ð5Þ
Once the E-OCIi;j of each item is known, its level of
impact is divided into two main aspects: frequency (by
the unavailability of the element) and consequence (by
the impact of the element). The consequence is E-
DFPi;j, which represents the effect on system j of ele-
ment i stopping. The effect of stopping element i may
have different results on system j depending on the state
of the elements that are also on level i. Particularly,
equation (7) is deducted from the definition of E-OCI













Figure 2 shows the FEI methodology and each phase
of the process. Table 1 shows a comparative analysis
between the main criticality and the operative impact
methodologies.
Case study
For the analytical development of this case study, the
selected process and equipment in the analysis are pre-
sented to develop the logical–functional sequence RBD
due to the complexity of the system with a large
amount of equipment. Then, the time to failure (TTF)
and the TTR are analyzed to validate and identify
trends and correlations. The parameterization is per-
formed according to the most suitable stochastic
model, which represents both the nature of the failure
and the process of repairing the equipment. The FEI is
individually and systematically developed to obtain the
main indicators and identify the equipment with the
highest impacts on the process.
The data were collected over a period of 16months
using the Plant Maintenance Module of SAP
Enterprise Resource Planning software (SAP-PM)
report from the mining industry in Chile. Considering
that current automatic capture systems provide rich
and complete data with respect to operational para-
meters, focused on prognosis and health management
application, data related to the state of the asset, spe-
cific process parameters, and downtimes. This data
repository is linked with information related to work
notifications and work orders. Accordingly, an enter-
prise resource planning (ERP) solution permits the
complete integration of information flow from all func-
tional areas by means of a single database that is acces-
sible through a unified interface and channel
communication. Hence, it is possible to apply the pro-
posed methodology using this consolidated database
validating the quality and quantity of the information.
The CSP case study
The case study is the smelting process of a mine in
Chile; the first stage of this process is smelting ore,
which contains a concentration of approximately 26%
copper. The pyro-metallurgical operations, which
enable the extraction of metallic copper, are performed
in type A converters (the melting process), type B con-
verters (the conversion process), slag cleaning furnaces
(the copper recovery process), fire refinement stoves
(the refined copper preparation process), and anodic
furnaces (the anodic copper preparation process). The
nominal production capacity of the smelting process is
60 tons/h. The resulting gases from the fusion conver-
sion process are treated in gas cleaning plants, which
also produce sulfuric acid that is primarily marketed in
the mining industry in the northern region of Chile.
Figure 2. FEI methodology.
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Therefore, the portfolio of products obtained through
these processes includes copper plates with 99.7% pur-
ity, fire refined copper ingots with 99.9% purity and sul-
furic acid derived from the processing of smelter gases
(Table 2). The analytical development of the case study
uses the main operational flow of the concentrate in the
smelting process, which is represented by the equipment
and subprocesses shown in Figure 3. The mining sub-
processes that are considered in this article are drying,
concentrate fusion, conversion, and refining.
Modeling the system
The logic behind the process operations can be repre-
sented using FT diagrams, which enable the subsequent
development of the RBD configuration. According to
Table 1, the FT is constructed as shown in Figure 4:
According to Figure 2, the smelting process is com-
posed of four subsystems arranged serially: the drying
subsystem (DS), which consists of two dryers in full
redundancy; the concentrate fusion subsystem (CFS),
which consists of two type A converters in full redun-
dancy; the conversion subsystem (CS), which consists
of three type B converters in a 3-2 configuration with
partial redundancy; and the refining subsystem (RS),
which consists of two work lines that separate the refin-
ing anode furnace (RAF) production from the anode
furnace (AF) plate production, with a load distribution
of 60% and 40%, respectively. Each subprocess is com-
posed of two elements in total redundancy. The classifi-
cation for the reliability analysis of the CSP is presented
in the FT diagram.
The quantitative analysis of the CSP considers the
operating conditions, failure data, maintenance times,
and other functional information needed to estimate
the RAM indicators for each piece of equipment, each
subsystem, and the total system. Reliability analysis
was performed using traditional algorithms.26
Data analysis
The collected data include TTF and TTR for each
equipment. The next step in data management is to
Table 1. Comparison of operative impact assessment methodologies.
Methodology Typology Focus Failure effect estimation Flexibility
Failure tree11 Qualitative Individual Failure analysis High
US Department of Defense27 Qualitative Individual Failure analysis High
Crespo et al.28 proposal Quantitative Systemic Expert criteria (1–5) Medium
FEI26 Quantitative Systemic Probabilistic impact analysis High
FEI: failure expected impact.
Table 2. CSP information.
Equipment Label Basic function Capacity (ton/h)
Nominal Maximum
Dryer 1 D1 Drying 30 60
Dryer 2 D2 30 60
Type A converter 1 CA1 Conversion type A 30 60
Type A converter 2 CA2 30 60
Type B converter 1 CB1 Conversion type B 20 30
Type B converter 2 CB2 20 30
Type B converter 3 CB3 20 30
Refining anode furnace 1 RAF1 Refining A 30 60
Refining anode furnace 2 RAF2 30 60
Anode furnace 1 AF1 Refining B 30 60
Anode furnace 2 AF2 30 60
CSP: copper smelting process.
Figure 3. Case study process diagram.
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determine the nature of the equipment that is involved
in the process. In this case, all of the equipment uses
the dynamics of serviceable equipment, and its subse-
quent distribution must be selected using relevant sto-
chastic models29 according to the behaviors of the data
in terms of trend and independence.
Trend and correlation analysis. Analyzing the data of the
equipment that is involved in the process, the
independence and trend indicators are calculated. The
calculated values of the test statistics for all of the
equipment failures and repair data are listed in Table 3.
Using the null hypothesis of an HPP, in which the test
statistic U is x2 distributed with 2(n2 1) degrees of free-
dom, the null hypothesis is not rejected at a 5% level of
significance in most of the equipment. The statistical
results show that the datasets for the majority of the
equipment, with the exceptions of the TTF data for
CB3, RAF1, and AF1, show no trends or serial
Figure 4. FT representation of the process.
Table 3. Statistical results for TTF and TTR data.
Subsystem Equipment Dataset Degrees of freedom Statistic U Rejection of null hypothesis at a
5% level of significance
DS D1 TTF 96 97.25 Not rejected (.76.11)
TTR 96 82.21 Not rejected (.74.40)
D2 TTF 66 57.32 Not rejected (.52.34)
TTR 66 51.31 Not rejected (.47.85)
CFS CA1 TTF 62 47.56 Not rejected (.39.65)
TTR 62 45.44 Not rejected (.40.67)
CA2 TTF 56 46.17 Not rejected (.38.95)
TTR 54 45.76 Not rejected (.38.65)
CS CB1 TTF 62 49.13 Not rejected (.33.56)
TTR 62 50.17 Not rejected (.34.55)
CB2 TTF 70 54.23 Not rejected (.47.36)
TTR 70 49.95 Not rejected (.42.72)
CB3 TTF 92 89.34 Rejected (\92.71)
TTR 90 87.36 Not rejected (.70.23)
RS RAF1 TTF 70 52.14 Rejected (\53.11)
TTR 70 56.22 Not rejected (.52.34)
RAF2 TTF 68 49.76 Not rejected (.42.57)
TTR 68 47.66 Not rejected (.43.54)
AF1 TTF 62 58.27 Rejected (\59.56)
TTR 62 60.22 Not rejected (.53.33)
AF2 TTF 54 41.56 Not rejected (.39.44)
TTR 52 41.75 Not rejected (.37.72)
TTF: time to failure; TTR: time to repair; DS: drying subsystem; CFS: concentrate fusion subsystem; CS: conversion subsystem; RS: refining
subsystem; RAF: refining anode furnace; AF: anode furnace.
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correlation. Therefore, the independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) assumption is rejected for these
equipment. Identical results were obtained from the
graphical trend analysis.14
Distribution fitting and calculation of basic indicators. The def-
inition of the probability distributions is commonly
used to describe the equipment failure and repair pro-
cesses. Different types of statistical distributions were
examined, and their parameters were estimated using
MATLAB.30 A statistical goodness-of-fit test was per-
formed to define the distributions of the operating times
and TTR. In particular, Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests25
at a significance level of a=0.1 were required to be sat-
isfied for p=0.1 at each setting. The null hypothesis
H0 is as follows: the data follow a normal, log-normal,
exponential, or Weibull distribution.
The equipment trend data should be analyzed using
a stochastic model for reparable elements. The NHPP
model used in this study is based on the power law pro-
cess (PLP). The x2 test and the Kolmogorov–Smirnov
test were classically encountered to validate the best-fit
distribution.31 The parameters that were estimated from
the failure data are listed in Table 4.
Table 4 also lists the basic indicator of reliability,
which is the mean time to failure (MTTF), the basic
indicator of maintainability, which is the mean time to
repair (MTTR), and the respective parameters of the
fitted curves.
According to the traditional setting (no trend), the
reliability parameters of the fitted curves (a, b), which
are based on the life cycle theory,31 show that the
equipment are in different phases of the bathtub curve.
b=1 is related to a constant failure rate or ‘‘useful’’
life phase; b . 1 is the phase in which the failure rate
typically increases, and additional service and mainte-
nance are needed. In the ‘‘wear-out’’ life phase, a tech-
nical and economic assessment is required to determine
the need for possible replacement, and in the b \ 1
phase, the component failure rate decreases over time.
Early life cycle problems are often due to failures in
design, incorrect installation, and operation by poorly
trained operators. Therefore, the statistical information
obtained from the curve fitting should be used to esti-
mate the system performance instead of explaining
individual equipment behavior.
The probability distribution that is commonly used
to represent repair times is the normal-logarithmic
Table 4. Fitting distributions of the TTF and TTR data.
Equipment Best fit (TTF data)
Distribution p value (K-S) Parameter 1 Parameter 2 MTTFi
D1 Weibull 0.29 a = 238 b = 1.13 228
D2 Weibull 0.17 a = 224 b = 1.2 211
CA1 Exponential 0.14 a = 253 b = 1.6 227
CA2 Weibull 0.43 a = 330 b = 1.4 300
CB1 Exponential 0.32 a = 256 b = 1 256
CB2 Weibull 0.29 a = 792 b = 1.34 722
CB3 NHPP-PLP 0.31 a = 402 b = 1.32 269
RAF1 NHPP-PLP 0.28 a = 351 b = 1.27 211
RAF2 Weibull 0.40 a = 144 b = 1.30 133
AF1 NHPP-PLP 0.23 a = 324 b = 1.31 203
AF2 Exponential 0.61 a = 315 b = 1 315
Equipment Best fit (TTR data)
Distribution p value (K-S) Parameter 1 Parameter 2 MTTRi
D1 Lognormal 0.57 m = 0.478 s = 2.24 4.94
D2 Lognormal 0.24 m = 0.731 s = 1.3 3.97
CA1 Lognormal 0.71 m = 0.940 s = 1.8 6.29
CA2 Normal 0.61 m = 4.8 s = 1.2 4.84
CB1 Lognormal 0.66 m = 1.31 s = 1.57 8.12
CB2 Lognormal 0.35 m = 1.45 s = 2.02 11.71
CB3 Normal 0.69 m = 7.33 s = 1.4 7.33
RAF1 Lognormal 0.21 m = 1.44 s = 1.1 7.31
RAF2 Lognormal 0.61 m = 0.872 s = 1.24 4.41
AF1 Lognormal 0.45 m = 1.31 s = 1.45 7.65
AF2 Lognormal 0.24 m = 0.91 s = 1.7 5.82
TTF: time to failure; TTR: time to repair; MTTF: mean time to failure; MTTR: mean time to repair; K-S: Kolmogorov–Smirnov; RAF: refining anode
furnace; AF: anode furnace.
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distribution, which explains the variability of repair by
two phenomena:32 the variation of the time associated
with accidental factors (negative exponential distribu-
tion) and the factors related to typical repair (normal
distribution).
System reliability analysis. CSP is divided into four subsys-
tems, which comprise a logical–functional configura-
tion series, that is, all subsystems must be operating to
ensure that the process performs properly. Subsystem
and system reliability is generally calculated using the
standard RBD formulas.5,22
Table 5 presents the main reliability results for differ-
ent operating times. The reliability results for the main
subsystem and total system are shown graphically in
Figure 5.
Through numerically and graphically analyzing the
reliability results, the DS and RS subsystems show an
accelerated decrease in reliability compared with the
other subsystems (exponential behavior). The CS sub-
system presents the best condition due to the redundant
configuration of the subsystem and the distinctly reli-
able behavior of the equipment. During the first 300 h,
the CFS subsystem presents the most reliable behavior
Table 5. Reliability evaluation of the CSP.
R(0) R(50) R(100) R(150) R(200) R(250) R(300) R(350) R(400)
System 1.000 0.948 0.785 0.568 0.360 0.196 0.088 0.031 0.009
DS 1.000 0.976 0.901 0.794 0.674 0.556 0.449 0.356 0.278
D1 1.000 0.842 0.687 0.552 0.440 0.347 0.273 0.213 0.166
D2 1.000 0.848 0.684 0.539 0.418 0.320 0.242 0.181 0.135
CFS 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.987 0.943 0.833 0.643 0.412 0.218
CA1 1.000 0.928 0.797 0.648 0.503 0.375 0.269 0.186 0.125
CA2 1.000 1.000 0.993 0.964 0.885 0.732 0.512 0.278 0.106
CS 1.000 0.987 0.942 0.869 0.778 0.679 0.580 0.486 0.401
CB1 1.000 0.823 0.677 0.557 0.458 0.377 0.310 0.255 0.210
CB2 1.000 0.979 0.946 0.907 0.864 0.820 0.773 0.727 0.681
CB3 1.000 0.953 0.882 0.802 0.721 0.640 0.564 0.492 0.426
RS 1.000 0.984 0.925 0.834 0.728 0.622 0.523 0.436 0.360
RAF subsystem 1.000 0.981 0.911 0.801 0.677 0.556 0.449 0.359 0.284
RAF1 1.000 0.917 0.807 0.694 0.588 0.491 0.405 0.331 0.268
RAF2 1.000 0.777 0.537 0.348 0.216 0.129 0.075 0.042 0.023
AF subsystem 1.000 0.988 0.948 0.884 0.806 0.721 0.635 0.551 0.473
AF1 1.000 0.917 0.807 0.694 0.588 0.491 0.405 0.331 0.268
AF2 1.000 0.853 0.728 0.621 0.530 0.452 0.386 0.329 0.281
CSP: copper smelting process; DS: drying subsystem; CFS: concentrate fusion subsystem; CS: conversion subsystem; RS: refining subsystem; RAF:
refining anode furnace; AF: anode furnace.
Figure 5. Reliability curves for the main subsystems in the CSP.
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due to its redundancy; after this time, the reliability
decreases exponentially (wear-out behavior).
To identify opportunities to improve the reliability,
processes should focus on subsystems with less reliabil-
ity over time, that is, DS and RS. This information is
the key for defining the intervals for preventive inter-
ventions. For example, if the reliability defined by an
organization to develop the preventive intervention of
critical equipment ranges between 75% and 80%, the
planning activities for the DS subsystem should range
between 75 and 100h of operation. However, the exam-
ined system presents an important level of redundancy
in three of its subsystems, which should also be consid-
ered when evaluating and defining future maintenance
policies. In practical terms, a corrective policy is gener-
ally assumed in redundant systems. However, to reach
this conclusion, individual assessment and identifica-
tion of critical subsystems and equipment as well as the
real costs of preventive and corrective interventions are
required.5
System maintainability analysis. In terms of individual
analyses, the maintainability has an important effect on
the equipment and systemic availability results.23 For
each element, TTR and MTTRi are required for the
next analysis. Table 5 lists the parametric information
for computing the MTTRi.
System availability analysis. With the information obtained
from the curve adjustments, the expected availabil-
ity5,22,33 was analyzed. Table 6 presents the results of
the expected availability calculations for the equipment,
subsystems, and system.
According to the results, the subsystem with the least
expected availability is RS, while CS has more availabil-
ity. For this particular case, the availability results are
consistent with the reliability results. Therefore, a prac-
tical mechanism is needed for identifying the highest E-
OCI and integrating the RAM results.
According to the procedure in section ‘‘FEI metho-
dology’’ and equations (2)–(6), the impacts of each
piece of equipment, each subsystem, and the system are
presented in Table 7.
Table 7 shows that D1 explains 14.57% of the lack
of effectiveness of the system, which is expressed as the
E-OCI; each D1 failure results in an expected 33.09%
loss of production capacity for the total system, which
is expressed as the E-DFP. Both impact indices are
dependent on the behavior of the equipment in terms
of the RAM results, operational context, and logical
dependencies as well as the indicators for the other
pieces of equipment in their subsystem (immediately
higher level). The E-DFP values for each subsystem are
equal, which is attributed to the serial configuration of
the system.
Using this analysis, the equipment and subsystems
that generate the highest impact on the availability or
production of the main system can be grouped together.
However, the results are not distinct. Therefore, conti-
nuity with a dispersion analysis is proposed in which
the X-axis corresponds to the unavailability and the Y-
axis corresponds to the E-DFP. In this manner, the gen-
erated curves correspond to the expected operational
criticality iso-impact curves.
Table 6. Expected availability calculation.






D1 227.69 4.94 97.88
D2 210.71 3.98 98.15
CFS 98.62
CA1 226.83 6.30 97.30
CA2 299.95 4.80 98.42
CS 99.83
CB1 256.00 8.13 96.92
CB2 721.85 11.70 98.40
CB3 269.38 7.33 97.35
RS 97.99
RAF subsystem 97.77
RAF1 211.13 7.32 96.65
RAF2 133.00 4.45 96.77
AF subsystem 98.31
AF1 202.94 7.58 96.40
AF2 315.00 5.81 98.19
MTTF: mean time to failure; MTTR: mean time to repair; DS: drying subsystem; CFS: concentrate fusion subsystem; CS: conversion subsystem; RS:
refining subsystem; RAF: refining anode furnace; AF: anode furnace.
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First, an analysis is performed at the subsystem level
(Figure 6); DS, CFS, CS, and RS have the same level
of E-DFP because they are in series. Therefore, the
unavailability of each subsystem creates a different E-
OCI. The subsystems RAF and AF have a smaller E-
DFP because they employ a load-sharing configuration
(60% of the load and 40% of the load, respectively) in
the RS subsystem.
Figure 7 shows the relatively low E-DFP for the
equipment, which is attributed to the redundancy in
each of the subsystems. Due to the serial configuration
of all subsystems, the E-DFP values are all identical,
with the exception of the RAF and AF subsystems,
which have different capacities and operational con-
texts. The order of the subsystems in terms of opera-
tional effectiveness is RS, CFS, DS, and CS. At the
individual level, the order of the equipment is as fol-
lows: CA1, D1, D2, RAF1, RAF2, AF1, CA2, AF2,
CB1, CB3, and CB2.
Conclusion
The reliability impact study is a relevant analysis to
develop a decision-making process. Considering the
standard methodologies, it is possible to establish that
there are no formal criteria to identify the impact of
each asset and its behavior or failure. So, it is necessary
to define a KPI oriented to establish a hierarchy and
determine the effectiveness of the KPI’s impact on the
elements.
A deep reliability analysis requires quality and quan-
tity of data; therefore, this article shows the importance
of the quality of information that is available for analy-
sis; the existing data should be audited to validate the
previous analysis.
The FEI methodology has significant potential
applications in several engineering problems, industrial
realities, and productive sectors. FEI is a powerful tool
for analysis and decision making for the various phases
of an industrial project via life cycle cost (LCC) for
design-oriented operations, such as capital expenditures
Figure 6. FEI methodology dispersion analysis for the subsystems.
Table 7. Calculation of E-OCI and E-DFP.













RAF subsystem 24.62 53.36
RAF1 12.53 18.05
RAF2 12.10 18.05
AF subsystem 16.42 46.78
AF1 10.92 14.65
AF2 5.50 14.65
E-OCI: expected operational criticality index; E-DFP: expected
downtime factor propagation; DS: drying subsystem; CFS: concentrate
fusion subsystem; CS: conversion subsystem; RS: refining subsystem;
RAF: refining anode furnace; AF: anode furnace.
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(CAPEX) and operational expenditures (OPEX), which
are associated with the improvement process.
The strengths of the FEI methodology include its
ability to systematically and quantitatively assess the
operational criticality in terms of the RAM indicators
and the logical configuration of subsystems and individ-
ual equipment, which directly affect each element in the
total system. This proposal complements plant model-
ing and analysis, from traditional methodologies. The
E-OCI is the final result of the computation process,
which enables the quantitative and unequivocal prioriti-
zation of the system elements to assess the associated
loss as ‘‘production loss’’ regarding its unavailability
and effect in the process. The latter concept enables esti-
mating the E-DFP of the equipment to determine the
individual effects of the detention and assess complex
and redundant scenarios.
The case study provides useful results for developing
a hierarchization that enables an analysis of improve-
ment actions that are aligned with the best
opportunities.
Considering the FEI methodology structure, it is
possible to conclude that it is replicable in different
application fields and can be easily automated.
Rankings that are based on the expected impact in the
operation are effective, recognize weaknesses and
opportunities, and serve as the basis for action plans
based on reliability and maintainability.
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